Population Dynamics of Iran from Sociological Approach

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Abstract
This paper examines intergenerational transmission associated with population dynamics from sociological approach. The discussion is based on the analysis of observations in a country that has experienced substantial changes in family formation resulting in one of the world's most spectacular falls in women's birth rate ever experienced in human history: Iran. Facing fundamental historical experiences and substantial socio-cultural changes over the past decades, the context of this study acts as a unique ‘social laboratory’ to survey the intergenerational comparisons. The results of this analysis show substantial intergenerational transmission, which provide new evidence to support Sauvey's (1978) and Weeks's (1994) socio-demographic investigations in some other developing countries.

Keywords: population dynamics; culture; religion; intergenerational transmission; Iran.

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INTRODUCTION
This paper presents evidence to explain population dynamics from a sociological perspective. The paper focuses on the context of Iran that observed substantial changes in family formation resulting in one of the world's most spectacular fall in women's birth rate ever experienced in human history (McDonald 2005: 18). Facing fundamental historical experiences and substantial socio-cultural changes over the past decades, Iran accounts for a unique ‘social laboratory’ to survey the socio-demographic consequences of traditional and modern views and values associated with women's status. The experiences can be tracked mainly in more than half-century Pahlavi monarchy period (the Shah’s regime: 1925-1979) when the government and society were predominantly influenced by the Western style, the 1979 Islamic Revolution period, the eight-year war with the neighbouring country Iraq (1980-1988), the post-revolutionary modernization period commencing with the First Development Plan (1989-1993), and further developing socio-cultural changes in more recent years.

In the search of exploring the true reason of the substantial demographic transition in Iran during the past decades, ‘social and cultural progress' has been identified as 'the keystone of the fertility decline in Iran’ (Ladier-Fouladi 1997: 213). Using a socio-cultural approach, the present paper provides evidence to explain the substantial intergenerational transmission of population dynamics over the last decades. In particular, the present paper aims to investigate the intergenerational transmission through contrasting predominant cultural views and values amongst the old and new generations with regard to family formation characteristics such as marriage and fertility patterns. This means that on the one hand, the paper highlights values and views associated with socio-demographic issues predominant amongst the old generation. This is explored here using the major popular beliefs, which typically reflect traditional views and values, and were predominantly and strongly believed in the past. On the other hand, the paper addresses the contemporary beliefs and attitudes regarding the socio-demographic issues in more recent years, which are particularly predominant amongst the new generation.
THEORETICAL APPROACH

Generally speaking, there is no doubt that people in all human societies are under the influence of culture. However, traditional societies are more substantially affected by cultural determinants so that culture, like an octopus, encompasses nearly all dimensions of both individual and social lives in such societies. Further, prior studies supported the important contribution of the cultural approach to explain family formation characteristics such as marriage and fertility patterns of women (e.g. Lesthaeghe 1983, Caldwell and Caldwell 1987, Hammel 1990, Hayes 1994, Weeks 1994, Fricke 1997).

Although culture is a phenomenal issue in the various fields of studies in social sciences, the definition of culture is a complicated matter in these fields. Laland and Hoppitt (2003: 150), for instance, have confirmed ‘the absence of a satisfactory and universally accepted definition of culture’ and have documented that the term, culture, ‘has become a quagmire for the social sciences’. Krober and Kluckhohn (1952) have identified more than one hundred definitions for culture. In Herskovits’s (1955) view, culture is the human-made part of the environment. Based of this view, Triandis (1996) divided culture into two separate sections: objective culture consisting of tools or roads etc, and subjective culture including beliefs, attitudes, norms, values and so forth. There is a similar classification of culture in which objective and subjective parts of culture are, respectively, named as material culture such as technologies and non-material culture containing ideas, values, beliefs etc.

Also, culture has been defined as ‘a system of views, values, symbols and behaviour shared by a group of people’ (Valk et al 2004: 9). Based on this definition, popular beliefs or proverbs can be attached to culture through views, values, or symbols. According to Webster (1982: 175, 173), popular and traditional beliefs or proverbs, as a ‘part of cognitive system of the culture in which they occur’, are helpful because they ‘would provide valuable clues about their character and culture’. In the literature, popular and traditional beliefs have been regarded as ‘vehicle of expression’ (Raymond 1981: 300), ‘impersonal vehicles for personal communication’ (Arewwa and Dundes 1964: 70), and ‘as vehicles of conventional wisdom’ (Goodwin and Wenzel 1981: 142). According to Raymond (1981:
proverbs or ‘popular utterance[s]’ are employed as one of pathways amongst scholars in social sciences and languages that ‘leads into a fundamental part of the language and culture of a national group’. Dundes (1981: 44) pointed out that ‘proverbs have never been adequately defined’. He, then, has identified proverbs as ‘traditional propositions’ which are ‘short sentences drawn from long experience’ (Dundes 1981: 61). Goodwin and Wenzel (1981: 142) and Seitel (1981) have also agreed that proverbs are short and traditional.

Using the intergenerational cultural transmission approach (Fernandez et al. 2004, Fortin 2005, Farre and Vella 2007), here, it is assumed that popular and traditional beliefs, like a mirror, reflect dominant beliefs, attitudes, values, and expectations of the majority of people or some groups in the society. Accordingly, they seem to be a good tool to reveal some parts of culture. People’s behaviour is, of course, considerably under the influences of such beliefs and expectations. It is also noteworthy that the existence and consistence of popular and traditional beliefs depend totally on favourable attitudes in the society towards them. In other words, the permanence of popular and traditional beliefs means that they are still acceptable and powerful on people’s behaviour in the society. However, popular and traditional beliefs will gradually vanish once social beliefs and attitudes are moved towards new views and values. This cultural change also provides a good basis to study the matter of intergenerational transmission, a method that has also been employed in this study.

DATA DESCRIPTION

This research data employed in this analysis are based on three main sources. First, in order to highlight the main socio-demographic characteristics of the country over the past decades, the paper uses various secondary data of Population and Housing Census published by the Statistical Center of Iran over the past decades. Second, this paper also relays on the research findings of a study focusing on the status and orientation of cultural values and beliefs identified by popular and traditional beliefs or proverbs regarding socio-demographic issues associated with family formation and women's
status (Foroutan 2000). Third, the discussion of this paper is also based on a recently conducted and nationally representative survey. It includes 4267 male and females aged 15 years old and over living in rural and urban areas of Ahvaz, Babolsar, Bojnord, Esfarayen, Gonbad Kavos, Hamadan, Kamyaran, Khoramabad, Mahmoudabad, and Saghez. Furthermore, the socio-demographic issues associated with family formation and women's status considered in this paper contain marriage patterns such as the desired age at marriage and mean age at first marriage, divorce rate, gender preference, infertility, fertility, the ideal number of children, reproductive health and family planning issues.

RESULTS OF THIS STUDY

Family Union: Marriage and Divorce
It is evident that women's birth rate is closely connected with the incidence of marriage and divorce. It is also important to mention that this association applies more significantly to societies such as Iran where, in contrary to the Western culture, birth outside the registered marriage is always both legally prohibited and socio-culturally unacceptable. This suggests that countries with high level of women's fertility are usually characterized as societies with high incidence of marriage and early marriage. In addition, divorce rate in such countries is considerably low mainly due to socio-cultural obligations and restrictions. As a result, women in such traditional settings usually stay longer in their reproductive ages and, consequently, they are potentially in the exposure of high fertility.

According to the Iranian traditional views and values predominant amongst the old generation, generally speaking, marriage is extremely important so that there is not any excuse to refuse it nearly under no circumstances. At the same time, unmarried men and women are expected to marry as soon as they can. Therefore, the postponement of

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1 The popular and traditional beliefs or proverbs highlighted in this study have been obtained from a large number of books (in Persian) dealing with the Iranian proverbs written by some of the best-known Iranian scholars such as Mehdi Sohili (1974), Ahmad Shamlo (1978), and Allame AliAkbar Dehkhoda (1978, 1982) detailed in the References section.
marriage is also undesirable. For example, according to the popular and traditional culture, it is believed that ‘only God deserves to be single and unique’. Further, in such cultural circumstances, even those people who are suffering financial hardship and cannot afford the expenditures of wedding and other costs related to marriage ceremony are expected to receive a loan enabling them to cope with the costs and to marry. It is interesting to mention that such people should not have any hesitation and concern to receive the loan because it is strongly believed that marriage is one of the best things that God likes it for His servants so He will surely help these people to cope with the difficulties. In other words, they have the best supporter, i.e. God, to repay the loan.

In contrast, the Iranian traditional beliefs reflect divorce as one of the worst possible things in the world. Couples, especially wives, have been strongly encouraged and invited to be patient and tolerant during their marital ties till death. For instance, it was traditionally believed that ‘as wife comes to her husband’s home upon marriage with a white dress [i.e. wedding dress], she should leave there only with a white dress’ [i.e. burial garment, too’]. This suggests that she is expected to close her eyes to the possible marital arguments and household’s difficulties from the beginning of marriage to the end of her life without complaining. However, the patient and tolerant husbands have also been appreciated: ‘a man who missed his wife due to death is better than a man who missed her because of divorce’. It is also worthwhile mentioning that in such cultural circumstances, even the judge usually tries to postpone issuing the verdict of divorce in the hope of giving more opportunity to the couple and to their close relatives for further negotiation to keep the marital tie. This also echoes the importance of family union in this cultural setting.

According to the results of this study shown in Table 1, it is evident that marriage patterns have substantially changed over the last decades in Iran. At the past time, when there were strongly positive views and values associated with marriage as highlighted above, a more considerable proportion of young women were married and the mean

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1 The popular and traditional beliefs or proverbs in this paper appear in Italics.
2 In this cultural context, the dead is first washed by his/her close relatives and then, he or she is covered by a white sheet prior to putting in tomb.
age at first marriage for women was remarkably low (around 18 years in 1956 and 1966). However, these marriage patterns no longer exist at the recent years as the traditional views and values associated with women's marriage have considerably removed from the society, particularly amongst the young generation. Accordingly, the mean age at first marriage for women increased markedly to about 24 years in 2006 and the proportion of women ever-married aged 15-19 declined significantly from about 40 per cent in 1976 to less than 20 per cent in 2006.

Furthermore, according to the results of the recent survey amongst the young generation illustrated in Table 2, almost half of young people aged 15-29 years old believe that their desired age at marriage for women is, on average, between 21-24 years old, and about one-fifth of them believe that it should be between 25-27 years old (see Table 2).

Table 1: Socio-demographic and reproductive health characteristics of Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population (million)</th>
<th>Urbanization Rate %</th>
<th>Total Fertility Rate</th>
<th>Mean age at marriage (females)</th>
<th>Literacy rate %</th>
<th>Infant Mortality Rate (2)</th>
<th>Contraceptive prevalence rate %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Computed from the Statistical Center of Iran (censuses of 1956-2006); Mirzaie (1998); Population Reference Bureau (2005a, b).

(1) In some cases, particularly for contraceptive prevalence rate, the percentages refer to the closest year of the corresponding year for which data were available.

(2) Infant mortality rate shows the proportion of death per 1000 live births.
Table 2: Attitude toward desired age of marriage for women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of respondents</th>
<th>Desired age of marriage for women (years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less than 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Survey in selected urban and rural areas of Iran detailed in Methodology section

Moreover, according to the results of this study illustrated in Figure 1, the divorce rate has experienced roughly an increasing trend over the recent years, particularly in urban areas. This can be partly explained by the fact that the previous traditional beliefs restricting divorce which were vastly predominant amongst the old generation are gradually losing their credit in the recent years so that the new generation, for instance, do not necessarily observe divorce as a stigma as it was in the past. As mentioned above, the increasing trend of divorce rate particularly applies to urban areas that can be mainly related to the fact that intergenerational transmission tends to occur in urban areas more evidently than in rural areas where traditional culture influencing family ties are relatively more predominant and long-standing. Moreover, the results of the survey detailed in the methodology section show that around one-third of young people aged 15-29 years old have a positive attitude towards divorce (Table 3). Accordingly, the marriage and divorce patterns of women highlighted above clearly echo an important intergenerational transmission regarding the views and values associated with family formation predominant amongst the old and new generations over the past decades.
Figure 1: Divorce Rate (per 10,000 ever married) in Iran: 1976 - 2000

![Graph showing divorce rate in Iran from 1976 to 2000, divided by urban and rural areas.]

Source: Computed from Statistical Center of Iran (SCI)

Table 3: Positive attitude toward divorce among young males and females aged 15-29 years old (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of respondents</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Survey in selected urban and rural areas of Iran detailed in Methodology section

Generational Gap in Fertility Pattern

Women's childbearing or fertility is one of the key issues in demography and population studies, which is usually measured by Total Fertility Rate (TFR) referring to the average number of children per woman during her reproductive ages (that is, ages 15-49). During the past decades, Iran has experienced a substantial decline in TFR: from more than 7 children per woman in 1956 to about 2 children per woman in 2006. This has been identified as one of 'the most
spectacular fall in birth rate ever experienced in human history' (McDonald 2005: 18). Addressing to the socio-cultural views and values associated with women’s childbearing predominant amongst the old and new generations, the discussion below attempts to provides evidence to explain this spectacular fall in women’s birth rate over the past decades from the window of culture.

Generally speaking, a strongly traditional approach to women’s childbearing warmly welcoming to the large family size can be evidently tracked in the cultural views and values predominant amongst the old generation in Iran. According to this approach, couples have been strongly encouraged to activate their reproductive potentialities. For instance, it has been traditionally believed that ‘a home full of enemies is better than a home with no child’, ‘wherever child is, there is no evil’, and ‘sun is the essence (spirit) of sky and child, particularly son, is the essence (spirit) of home’. Further, in this cultural setting, there has not been any concern for having more children because it is ideologically believed that the real creator of child is God, and not parents. As a result, the real creator will surly assist the parents to keep their child alive against hanger and disease as He created the child. For example, it has been culturally and religiously believed that ‘someone who gave teeth, i.e. God, He would certainly provide food, too’. This belief tends to assure the parents that the real creator, i.e. God, is totally compassionate and merciful to His servants to do not leave them alone to die due to hunger and starvation.

In contrast, infertility has not been warmly welcomed in the Iranian traditional culture. In this context, a woman who is biologically unable to give birth does not have a socially and culturally positive and acceptable status in both family and society. For instance, it has been believed that ‘an infertile woman is a stranger’. This can be also interpreted in this way that a woman would be identified as an acquaintance in family and society as long as she is able to activate the potentiality of reproduction because otherwise she would be considered as a stranger in the family and society. It is noteworthy that the infertility of a woman may give socially a right to her husband to remarry in the hope of having children in his remarriage, either by keeping or breaking the first union. However, it is also important to mention that it does not seem that such a socially acceptable right
could be equally given to a woman whose husband is infertile. This observation does not only address a gender inequality, but also again emphasizes the fact that how vitally important women’s fertility has been in this cultural context.

Accordingly, in such a cultural environment, couples have been socially and culturally encouraged to activate their reproductive potentialities as much as they could. This leads to the fact that women’s fertility in Iran has reached a substantially high rate in the past. For instance, TFR was about 7 children per woman in 1956 and 1966 when such traditional views and values associated with women’s childbearing have been markedly predominant amongst the old generation. In the interim, other factors such as the high rates of illiteracy, child mortality, and low rate of urbanization have also facilitated such a demographic outcome (see Table 1).

However, the pattern highlighted above is no longer the case in the recent years as the new generation tends to contribute their own views and values associated with women’s childbearing, which are significantly different with those of the old generation highlighted above. In contrary to the high value associated with women’s fertility in the past time, people in recent years have given high value to the small family size so that TFR declined markedly to about 2 children per woman in 2006 (see Table 1). This tends to be a more evident observation amongst young generation in more recent years. For instance, the results of the survey detailed in the methodology section indicate that not only the vast majority of young people aged 15-29 years old prefer to have two children in their marital life but also a considerable proportion of the younger people aged 15-19 years old have shown that ‘only one child’ is their ideal number of family size. Almost the same patterns have been observed in other studies (Abbasi-Shavazi et al 2009; Foroutan 2014). It is also important to state that such an intergenerational transmission of values associated

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1 According to the author’s another research (Foroutan 2002) regarding the socio-cultural changes of ageing in Iran during the last decades, the proportion of divorced female elders substantially exceeds that of their male counterparts. This pattern has been mainly explained by gender differences in this cultural context in which (even amongst elderly) divorced males are more than divorced females socio-culturally allowed to remarry, whereas divorced women are much more likely to stay unmarried for the rest of their life.
with family formation and women’s fertility behaviour has been accompanied by substantial progress in modernization characterized by the rising rates of education, urbanization, health services, and contraceptives use (see Table 1). Therefore, it is acknowledged that a wide range of factors contributed to the women’s birth fall in Iran during the recent years\(^1\). However, the results of this study, in accordance with prior studies (e.g. Ladier-Fouladi 1997; Abbasi-Shavazi 2009, Foroutan 2014), emphasize the fact that the spectacular fertility transition in Iran mainly lies in different socio-cultural views and values contributed by the old and new generations.

**Table 4: Attitude toward ideal number of children among young people aged 15-29 years old (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of respondents</th>
<th>One child</th>
<th>Two children</th>
<th>Three children</th>
<th>4 children and more</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The Survey in selected urban and rural areas of Iran detailed in Methodology section*

**Generational Change in Gender (Sex) Preference**

It is worthwhile to state that gender preference plays a significant role in family formation and women's status including their fertility behaviour and reproductive health. Indeed, countries facing high fertility and low reproductive health for women are often characterized by the fact that couples tend to give preference to a certain sex of births, particularly male births. In such circumstances, it is more likely that couples often tend to discontinue childbearing only once they became sure that they have at least one child of the desired

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\(^1\) For instance, this refers to a list of factors consisting of governmental family planning programs, the increasing first age at marriage, economic hardship, the increasing cost of living, the increasing cost of childbearing especially education, job-finding difficulties as well as increasing accessibility to electricity, TV, radio, and piped water in rural area (Ladier-Fouladi 1997; Mirzaie 1998; Abbasi-Shavazi 2002).
gender among their ever-born children. The discussion below provide evidence as to whether such a preference has been prevalent in Iran and how significantly the country's demographic figures over the past decades could be affected by such a gender preference amongst the old and new generations.

Generally speaking, the traditional beliefs predominant amongst the old generation in Iran could be identified by a wide range of gender preference at which male gender is often prioritized to female gender (Foroutan 2012, 2018). Such cultural beliefs have been demonstrated in different ways, which are classified in three main groups in this study. Firstly, some of these traditional beliefs have been displayed explicitly and directly. For instance, it has been believed that ‘it would be better if the newly-born baby was not a girl, otherwise she is preferred to be sent out to husband’s home [i.e. getting married shortly] or to cemetery [that is, getting died]’. This suggests that the life of females is closely related to marriage which enables them to emerge their capability only beside husband. This has also been clearly demonstrated in the traditional beliefs that 'girls are not eligible to express their ideas until getting married’. It is also worthwhile noting that the newly-married couples have been much more likely to be told by their families, relatives, neighbours, and friends that 'hope God gives you a son' rather than a girl or even a child without identifying the gender of child.

Secondly, the traditional beliefs associated with gender preference have also been displayed indirectly and implicitly. This is mainly identified through attributing the typical negative characteristics to female gender, whereas the positive ones have been usually monopolized for male gender. For instance, females have been often identified by characteristics such as disloyal, ineligible for consultancy, unable to keep secrets, often complainer and nagger, and insufficiently-wise. It has also been believed that women’s dream is not true and has inverse interpretation and application in the real life. On the other hand, positive characteristics have been mostly attributed to males so that they have been described as loyal, honest, confident and reliable to keep secrets. In a more comprehensive perception, ‘being man’ provides a wide variety of advantages ranging from a physical viewpoint (that is, bravery) to psychological one at which males are regarded to be so loyal and reliable that under no
circumstances they breach what they promise. In sum, males in this context are so strongly and positively regarded that it has been traditionally believed that a ‘man is a little God at home’.

Thirdly, once females appear as wives and particularly as mothers, not only gender preference against them tends to be markedly moderated but also they are more likely to be considered positively in the traditional beliefs. For example, it has been traditionally believed that ‘although wife is the source of inconvenience, it is hoped that there is not any home without this source’, ‘the key of man’s wisdom is in the hand of his wife’, ‘a man who does not have wife, he does not have a source of tranquility, neither’, and ‘man is the brain of home and wife is its heart’. It is, however, important to state that even such positive descriptions about females are not as strong as those for males mentioned before. Moreover, such positive descriptions mainly apply to married women, which suggests the fact that the traditional beliefs identify women positively only when they are beside a husband.

Here, it is argued that such male-dominated traditional beliefs predominant amongst the old generation have played a substantial role in the demographic figures of Iran over the past decades. Such traditional beliefs can also affect women’s reproductive health. This lies in the fact that due to religious and socio-cultural considerations, abortion is basically illegal in the country. It is allowed only due to medical reasons, i.e. the life and health of mother, prescribed by authorities. More importantly, the high levels of women’s fertility in the past (see Table 1) are significantly associated with the predominant traditional culture which has been partly highlighted in the above male-dominated traditional beliefs. However, such traditional views and values are no longer the dominant pattern in the recent years, particularly amongst the new generation. Accordingly, the substantial fall in women’s birth rate needs to be in part contributed to such a generational transmission identified by the different types of predominant views and values associated with gender preference over the past decades. For instance, the results of the recent survey shown in Table 2, suggest that despite the strong male-dominated traditional beliefs in the past, gender preference is no longer as predominant as in the past. According to the results of the survey detailed in the methodology section, the majority of the young
people aged 15-29 years old (more than two-thirds of them) either do not believe any gender preference (whether son or girl) or prefer to have equal number of female and male children in their marital life.

Table 5: Attitude toward gender preference desired age of marriage for women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of respondents</th>
<th>Categories of gender preference</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal number of boy and girl</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No gender preference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daughter preference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Son preference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>22.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Survey in selected urban and rural areas of Iran detailed in Methodology section

Family Planning Programs: Cultural Compatibility

The issue of intergenerational cultural transmission can also be tracked in the family planning program of Iran over the past decades. The following discussion addresses the fact that the success of family planning program or its failure in various stages have been closely associated with its (in) compatibility with the cultural beliefs which have been partly highlighted above. This has been particularly the case in the past when traditional views and values associated with women’s childbearing-related issues were significantly predominant. The experience of substantial swings regarding childbearing policies is also in part the consequence of different types of governments which came to power in the country over the past decade.

Until 1967, although there was no systematic population policy, the government had a pro-natalist approach supporting larger family size. The Shah’s Western style regime implemented the first phase of family planning program in 1967, which was mainly aimed to decrease the birth rate. The program continued until 1979 when the regime felt down by the Islamic Revolution. As shown in Table 1, total fertility rate decreased during 1966 and 1976, which is partly the
consequence of the first phase of family planning program. However, this birth fall is insignificant (from about 7 children per woman in 1966 to 6.3 children per woman in 1976). Accordingly, the question is why the first phase of the family planning program could not result in a significant birth fall? In brief, the answer mainly lies in the predominant traditional culture of childbearing which has been highlighted above. This means that the country was also strongly dominated by traditional views and values supporting high incidence of marriage, early marriage, divorce as a stigma, birth as a God's matter and male preference, leading to a large family size. Such traditional beliefs were accompanied by other socio-demographic characteristics, particularly high rate of illiteracy and high proportion of people living in rural areas where such traditional beliefs are often more likely to exist (see Table 1). It is also important to mention that the society was suspicious about the Shah's birth control program. This was mainly due to people's cultural and religious concerns as they believed that birth control program was a type of intervention in the will of God. Accordingly, mainly because of such traditional beliefs, the first phase of family planning program was not warmly welcomed in the country by the nation. This tends to be a similar experience with what was observed in India where the government's strong birth control programs in 1960s and 1970s did not lead to a significant fall in women's birth rate. This has been mainly explained by the fact that the Indian traditional culture was substantially committed to large family size so that even the government's violent birth control programs could neither deliberate provisions to cope with such traditional culture (Sauvy 1978, Weeks 1994).

Upon the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the new government implemented a strong pro-natalist population approach and provided a

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1 Other scholars have also asserted nearly the same argument. For instance, Ladier-Fouladi (1997: 201) documented three obstacles that encountered the road to Iran's family planning programs in the first phase: cultural traditions, the lack of facilities and trained personnel. Also, Abbasi-Shavazi et al (2002: 26) argued that the neglecting of 'the socio-cultural and religious context’ was the reason of not warmly welcoming to the first phase of family planning programs in the society, particularly in rural areas.
wide range of facilities in order to support the larger family size\(^1\). The commencement of the war between Iran and Iraq in September 1980 accelerated such a pro-natalist population policy. However, the demographic figures drawn from the 1986 population census were observed as a serious threat for the country\(^2\). Eventually, after one decade opposition, the second phase of family planning programs was recommenced in 1989 in order to facilitate the establishment of economic development programs in the post-war era of modernization. The government also employed a wide range of facilities and services including the involvement of religious institutions throughout the country to support the family planning programs. Such provisions have particularly targeted rural areas where often a higher birth rate for women exists. This has also been due to the fact that such provisions were rightfully observed more essential to assist rural people to resolve the challenging compatibility of traditional culture and birth control programs because they often contribute stronger traditional views and values of large family size. Accordingly, these careful deliberations led to the fact that the second phase of family planning programs not only were warmly welcomed in the country but also played a significant role in the country's exceptional fall in women's birth rate in the recent years\(^3\).

As discussed before, people particularly the young generation in Iran in the recent years prefer to postpone childbearing and to have small family size. Accordingly, they mostly accept birth control programs to

\(^1\) For instance, youths were warmly encouraged by religious leaders to marry as soon as possible and the costs associated with marriage were often simply affordable. Meanwhile, people with a greater number of children were given priority to receive governmental supports such as housing loans and job opportunity.

\(^2\) The results of the 1986 population census have shown a surprising population of almost 50 million (relative to about 34 million the earlier census in 1976), a return to a higher fertility level and an exceptionally high rate of the annual population growth (about 4 per cent between 1976 and 1986).

\(^3\) It is, however, acknowledged that a wide range of factors (such as the increasing first age at marriage, economic hardship, the increasing cost of living, the increasing cost of childbearing especially education, job-finding difficulties as well as increasing accessibility to electricity, TV, radio, and piped water in rural area) contributed to the birth fall of Iran so that ‘not all the credit of fertility decline should be given to the government and its family planning programs’ (Abbasi-Shavazi 2002: 429).
achieve such demographic goals. For instance, as shown in Table 1, the contraceptive prevalence rate in Iran increased markedly from 36 per cent in 1976 to 74 per cent in 2006.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In the course of the intergenerational cultural transmission approach (Fernandez et al. 2004, Fortin 2005, Farre and Vella 2007), this paper has provided research-based evidence to highlight the role of traditional and modern views and values shaping significantly different socio-demographic features associated with family formation and women's status in Iran over the past decades. The country's different socio-demographic features are mainly characterized by substantial changes in women's marriage and fertility patterns. In particular, the country experienced a substantial fall in birth rate for women that was observed as one of 'the most spectacular fall in birth rate ever experienced in human history' (McDonald 2005: 18): from more than 7 children per woman in 1956 to about 2 children in 2006. The paper has mainly associated the country's high fertility in the past to the traditional culture predominant amongst the old generation. The socio-demographic consequences of this traditional culture were mainly a high incidence of marriage, early marriage, low mean age at first marriage, divorce as stigma, and low contraceptives use leading to a large family size. This traditional culture has also been identified as the most important obstacle against the country's first family planning program implemented in 1968. In the interim, some other socio-economic characteristics particularly the low rates of literacy and urbanization have also facilitated such demographic figures in the past. This has been observed the same pattern as the Indian experience where the traditional culture was observed as the main source of the failure of the government's birth control program in 1960s and 1970s (Sauvy 1978, Weeks 1994).

The country, however, has experienced substantial social progress in the recent years that resulted in shaping modern views and values, particularly predominant amongst the young generation. Upon such an intergenerational transmission, the traditional views and values associated with family formation and gender roles have markedly changed over the recent years. This has been mainly characterized by
new patterns of marriage and family size so that people, particularly women, have preferred to postpone the ages of marriage and childbearing and to minimize the family size during the recent years. Accordingly, birth control programs enabling them to reach such demographic goals have also been warmly welcomed in the society. In the interim, other modernization characteristics particularly the rising rates of urbanization, health services, contraceptives use, education (especially, an incredible increase in women's education), the substantial rise in the cost of child, and increasing access to modern communication technologies and social media particularly among the young generation have also facilitated Iran's substantial fall in birth rate in the recent years. In sum, in accordance with Sauvey's (1978) and Weeks's (1994) explanation regarding the substantial effect of cultural change in demographic transition of Asian countries such as India, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan, this study has provided new and further research-based evidence to emphasis the fact that the intergenerational cultural transmission has played the most important role in substantial changes in socio-demographic characteristics associated with family formation and population dynamics in Iran.

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